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Abstract Vicarious learning has become an established indi-
rect pathway to fear acquisition. It is generally accepted that
associative learning processes underlie vicarious learning; how-
ever, whether this association is a form of conditioned stimulus-
unconditioned stimulus (CS-US) learning or stimulus–response
(CS-CR) learning remains unclear. Traditionally, these types of
learning can be dissociated in a US revaluation procedure. The
current study explored the effects of post-vicarious learning US
revaluation on acquired fear responses. Ninety-four children (46
males and 48 females) aged 6 to 10 years first viewed either a
fear vicarious learning video or a neutral vicarious learning vid-
eo followed by random allocation to one of three US revaluation
conditions: inflation; deflation; or control. Inflation group chil-
dren were presented with still images of the adults in the video
and told that the accompanying sound and image of a very fast
heart rate monitor belonged to the adult. The deflation group
were shown the same images but with the sound and image of a
normal heart rate. The control group received no US revalua-
tion. Results indicated that inflating how scared the models ap-
peared to be did not result in significant increases in children’s
fear beliefs, avoidance preferences, avoidance behavior or heart
rate for animals above increases caused by vicarious learning. In
contrast, US devaluation resulted in significant decreases in fear
beliefs and avoidance preferences. Thus, the findings provide
evidence that CS-US associations underpin vicarious learning
and suggest that US devaluationmay be a successful method for
preventing children from developing fear beliefs following a
traumatic vicarious learning episode with a stimulus.
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Modeling
Since Rachman’s (1977) original suggestion that fear of an
animal, object or situation can be acquired by observing an-
other individual’s fear of it, vicarious learning has become
established as an indirect pathway to fear acquisition. Evi-
dence of this in children comes from direct experimental in-
vestigations showing that vicarious learning can influence fear
beliefs (e.g., Askew et al. 2008, 2013; Askew and Field 2007;
Dunne and Askew 2013), behavioral preferences and avoid-
ance (e.g., Askew et al. 2013; Askew and Field 2007; De
Rosnay et al. 2006; Dubi et al. 2008; Dunne and Askew
2013; Egliston and Rapee 2007; Gerull and Rapee 2002),
heart rate and attentional bias (e.g., Reynolds et al. 2014).
However, the mechanisms underlying vicarious fear learning
in humans, particularly children, are less well established.
It is generally assumed that associative learning processes un-
derpin vicarious learning (e.g., Askew and Field 2008; Bandura
1969; Berger 1962; Davey 2002; Field 2006a; Hygge 1976;
Mineka and Cook 1993; Mineka and Zinbarg 2006); however,
this idea has received relatively little attention. There are essen-
tially two possibilities for what associations are formed during
vicarious learning: stimulus–response (S-R or CS-CR) learning,
inwhich a conditioned stimulus (CS; e.g., an animal) is associated
with an individual’s fear-related conditioned response (CR) to the
stimulus; or stimulus-stimulus (CS-US) learning, in which a CS
evokes a fear-related response via its association with an uncon-
ditioned stimulus (US). In CS-US learning, a child observing a
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model acting fearfully (US) in response to an animal (CS) would
associate the animalwith themodelled response and subsequently
develop a similar fearful response to the animal. Alternatively, if
CS-CR associations underpin vicarious learning, the child would
associate their own fearful response with the animal.
It is often assumed that irrespective of how fears and pho-
bias were originally acquired they can all generally be under-
stood in terms of CS-US associations (e.g., Davey 2002; Field
2006a;Mineka and Cook 1993;Mineka and Zinbarg 2006). In
both animals and humans, the contiguous presence of a US
(e.g., electric shock) that evokes an unconditioned response
(e.g., pain) with a neutral CS (e.g., light or buzzer) leads to the
learning of associations between the CS and US, and this
association mediates the CR, so that the CS comes to directly
evoke a CR (e.g., fear) via a representation of the USwhen it is
subsequently encountered alone. Similarly, in vicarious learn-
ing, an observer is assumed to associate a CS with a model’s
reaction (the US) to that CS so that the CS evokes a CR related
to the US. Procedurally, this assumes that vicarious learning
can be understood in the same framework as direct
conditioning.
Traditionally, stimulus-stimulus (CS-US) and stimulus–re-
sponse learning can be dissociated using a US revaluation
procedure (Rescorla 1974). US revaluation is the phenomenon
whereby the severity of a US (the outcome of a learning epi-
sode) is inflated or deflated in isolation (without the presence
of the CS with which it has been associated) following initial
CS-US learning. This change in valuation of the US is
achieved using direct exposure to, or information about, the
US and results in a change in fear responses to the CS, even
though the CS was never directly presented with the revalued
US (Dickinson 1980; Rescorla 1974, 1980). Therefore, the
strength of the CR can be dramatically modified independent
of direct CS-US contingency (Davey 1989). In the animal
literature, this revaluation is carried out via individual experi-
ence with the US, such as making a US more aversive by
aversion learning or making it less aversive by habituating
an animal to a shock US in aversive conditioning (e.g.,
Cleland and Davey 1982; Davey andMcKenna 1983; Holland
and Rescorla 1975; Rescorla 1980).
In the human literature, verbally transmitted information
has been used to revalue the outcome of an initial learning
event (e.g., Davey 1983, 1987, 1989; Davey and McKenna
1983). Initially participants are provided with pairings of a CS
and a US until a CR is established. Next participants receive
revaluation training with the US only (for example, simply
being told that on future occasions, the US will be less in-
tense). Finally, the participant is provided with test trials with
the CS only. The rationale is that if a CS-US association me-
diates the CR, then revaluing the US will also change the CR.
On the other hand, if the CR is mediated by stimulus–response
(CS-CR) associations, then revaluing the US will not change
the CR. Logically then, if US revaluation has an effect on a
CR to a CS, it can be concluded that stimulus-stimulus asso-
ciations underpin learning rather than stimulus–response as-
sociations, and therefore that the CR can be modified by ex-
periences outside of the original learning event.
US revaluation not only provides a means of differentiating
stimulus-stimulus and stimulus–response associations, but al-
so provides a potential explanation for why intense fear may
subsequently develop following even a mild learning episode.
That is, later inflating the aversiveness of a US can increase
the initially acquired fear-related response to an associated
CS. Davey (1989) reports that acquisition of a CS-US associ-
ation is independent of US revaluation, so it is possible that a
CS-US association can be learnt when the US is relatively
nonaversive (sensory preconditioning; Prewitt 1967; Rizley
and Rescorla 1972). But if the US is later experienced alone
at a greater intensity, the subsequent US inflation will result in
a stronger fear response to the CS. Thus Davey (1989; 1997)
has argued that US revaluation can explain one of the common
criticisms of the conditioning account of fears and phobias;
that not all individuals who have a phobia of a particular
stimulus, object or situation, can recall a traumatic effect re-
lated to the onset of their fear (e.g., Rachman 1977). An initial
traumatic experience is actually unnecessary for fear to devel-
op later.
If vicarious fear learning is procedurally similar to CS-US
learning (e.g., Mineka and Cook 1993; Mineka and Zinbarg
2006) we would expect to find US revaluation effects. A vi-
carious learning event would result in an observer forming an
association between a representation of the CS and the
model’s fearful response (US) to the CS, even if it did not
directly evoke a fear response (unconditioned fear response:
UR) in the observer. If the observer’s fearful response (US) is
later revaluated as more aversive, the fear-related response to
the associated CS would also increase (see Askew and Field
2007, 2008). That is, like in direct conditioning, US revalua-
tion would result in the acquisition of fear after the initial,
relatively mild, vicarious learning episode. Askew et al.
(2008) explored the interactive effects of vicarious learning
and the transmission of information by providing children
with positive, negative or no verbal information about three
previously unencountered animals before, during, or after a
vicarious learning procedure involving the animals. Vicarious
learning consisted of children seeing pictures of the animals
together with pictures of faces modeling fear. Negative infor-
mation provided beforehand about how threatening the ani-
mals were facilitated the effects of vicarious learning on fear
beliefs. However, verbal information given either during or
following vicarious learning did not affect the learning of fear
beliefs. Information given following learning consisted of the
fear models explaining that they were actually more scared
than they appeared in the pictures (US) children had seen of
them. If vicarious learning is a form of CS-US learning this
inflation of the US should have increased children’s fear
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beliefs for animals (CS) seen with these faces. Given the re-
sults, there are two possible conclusions, either: CS-US asso-
ciations are not formed during vicarious fear learning; or ver-
bal information was an unsuccessful method for inflating the
US in Askew et al.’s study.
It is important to identify the type of associations formed in
vicarious learning, not just for the theoretical literature, but
also for clinical interventions. Understanding learning mech-
anisms is crucial for establishing how phobias are acquired
and also so that treatments designed to reduce children’s fear
can be targeted correctly. If clinicians can identify a child’s
learning history, and thus the nature of the vicariously ac-
quired associations underlying the child’s fear, interventions
can be targeted at weakening these associations.
Early research (e.g., Kravetz 1974) suggests that auditory
changes in heart rate are sufficient to vicariously condition
changes in listening participants’ heart rates; therefore, in the
current study auditory cues were used to revalue the US. Chil-
dren viewed either a fear or a neutral vicarious learning video
followed by random allocation to one of three US revaluation
groups. Children in the US inflation group were shown still
images of the adults in the video and informed that film (with
sound) of a very fast beating heart rate monitor belonged to the
adult in the image. AUS deflation group were shown the same
images but with the sound and film of a normal heart rate.
Children in the control group received no revaluation. Chil-
dren’s fear beliefs, avoidance preferences and behavioral
avoidance were measured following the vicarious learning
and revaluation procedures. It was predicted that (a) in line
with previous studies, children who experienced fear model-
ing but no revaluation (control group) would show increased
fear beliefs, avoidance preferences, behavioral avoidance, and
heart rate for the modeled animal, (b) children experiencing
fear modeling followed by US inflation would show elevated
fear responses compared to the fear modeling control group,
and (c) children who saw fear modeling then US deflation
would not show the increased responses observed in the con-
trol group. If children’s fear responses change as a result of US
revaluation, then it can be argued that CS-US associations
underpin vicarious learning. If there is no change, CS-CR
associations are likely to underpin learning.
Method
Children saw a vicarious learning video of either a scared or
neutral model (US). Within each of these two modeling type
groups, children were further assigned to one of three revalu-
ation groups; inflation, deflation or control. Measures were
taken within each child for two different animal CSs (the
quokka and the cuscus), one seen in the vicarious learning
video and one not, so that there was always a within child
comparison between the modeled and unmodeled animal
and a between groups comparison between fear modeling
and neutral modeling. This design was used to ensure that
there was an appropriate within-child control and resulted in
a 2(modeling condition: modeled vs. unmodeled)×2(model-
ing type: fear vs. neutral)×3(revaluation: inflation, deflation,
control) mixed design with modeling condition compared
within children and modeling type and revaluation type com-
pared between groups. Animals were counterbalanced across
the six groups. The study was approved by the ethics commit-
tee at Kingston University.
Participants
Ninety-four children from two schools in Essex and Suffolk,
UK (46 males and 48 females), with an age range of 6 to
10 years and a mean age of 8.03 (SD=0.85) years, participated
in the experiment. This age range was chosen because norma-
tive fears of animals often develop around this age (e.g., Field
and Davey 2001; Öst 1987). Only children with informed
parental consent were able to take part in the study, and all
children gave verbal assent before participating.
Materials
With the exception of the behavioral avoidance and behavioral
preferences tasks, the remainder of the experiment was auto-
mated, using a program written in E-Prime 2.0 by the first
author, on a Samsung RF511 Laptop and a ProLite
T2451MTS 24″ Touchscreen Monitor.
Animal CSs Two Australian marsupials unknown to the chil-
dren, a quokka and a cuscus (see also Askew and Field 2007;
Field 2006b; Field and Lawson 2003), were used in the ex-
periment because UK children do not typically have prior
experience or fear expectations for these animals (e.g., Dunne
and Askew 2013).
Fear Beliefs Questionnaire (FBQ) Fear-related beliefs about
the quokka and cuscus were measured using a computer-
based Fear Beliefs Questionnaire (Field and Lawson 2003),
containing seven questions for each animal; for example,
BWould you be scared if you saw a quokka?^ and BWould
you be happy to have a cuscus for a pet?^ Children responded
on a 5-point Likert scale: 0 (No, not at all), 1 (No, not really), 2
(Don’t know/Neither), 3 (Yes, probably), and 4 (Yes,
definitely). Thus there were a total of 14 questions and a mean
fear beliefs score for each animal was calculated for each
child. Internal consistency was high; before vicarious learn-
ing: Cronbach’s α=0.86 (Quokka subscale), 0.85 (Cuscus
subscale); and after vicarious learning: α=0.91 and 0.88
respectively.
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Videos USs Each child watched one silent (approx. 45 s) vid-
eo clip. The video showed three female adults individually
approaching a box thought to contain a quokka or a cuscus
and placing their hand in the box to touch the animal. In the
fear video, the females looked fearful, hesitant and nervous
about placing their hand in the box. In the neutral video, the
females showed no fear and happily placed their hand in the
box. There were four videos in total: a fear and neutral quokka
film and a fear and neutral cuscus film.
Nature Reserve Task (NRT) The nature reserve task (see Field
and Storksen-Coulson 2007) utilized a rectangular board
(size: 680 mm×500 mm) embellished with green felt as grass,
and green trees and brown fences made from pipe cleaners.
Two Lego figures (a male and female) were used to represent
the child.
Touch Boxes A touch-box behavioral avoidance task (see
Askew and Field 2007; Field and Lawson 2003; Kelly et al.
2010) was used to measure avoidance of the animals and
consisted of two straw-filled pet carrier boxes (size:
260 mm×460 mm×340 mm), with breathing holes and one
large hole (diameter: 14 cm) for children to place their hand
through. There was a course fabric flap on the inside of the
hand hole so that children could not see into the box.
Heart Rate Monitor A Contec Finger Probe Pulse Oximeter
was attached to the child’s finger during the touch-box task in
order to measure heart rate. This portable device was selected
because of its successful use in previous similar research
(Reynolds et al. 2014) and its non-intrusive nature, which
allows free movement to approach the boxes.
Procedure
The setting was a school room familiar to children and each
child participated individually. The whole procedure took ap-
proximately 20 min.
NRT 1 Children were asked to imagine that the board was a
nature reserve and one of the animals (e.g., a quokka) was at
one end of the reserve depicted by a photograph of the animal.
Children were then asked to place a Lego figure representing
them somewhere on the reserve where they would most like to
be. They then placed the Lego figure on the board and the
distance to the animal was measured. The same procedure
was repeated for the second animal (e.g., a cuscus). The order
in which the animals were presented was counterbalanced
across children.
FBQ 1 Children sat in front of the touch-screen monitor and
completed the FBQ. A picture of the animal (quokka or
cuscus) was displayed in the middle of the screen to ensure
children were always responding for the correct animal, and
the question appeared in bold lettering across the top of the
screen. Children were asked to touch one of five buttons at the
bottom of the screen, ranging from 1 (No, not at all) to 4 (Yes,
definitely).
Vicarious Learning Children then watched either the fear or
neutral video on the touch-screen monitor. Within the fear and
neutral video groups, the animals were counterbalanced so
that half of the children in each group saw the adult ostensibly
approach a cuscus, and for the other half it was a quokka.
US Revaluation Only children in the inflation and deflation
groups received this phase of the study. Children in the control
groups (fear video-control and neutral video-control) moved
straight on to the second FBQ. All children in this phase ini-
tially saw an 8 s video clip (with audio) of a heart rate monitor
displaying an accelerated heart beat (approx. 100 bpm) and
were told this is what someone’s heart rate looks and sounds
like when they are scared. They were then shown an 8 s video
clip of a normal heart beat (approx. 68–72 bpm) and told this
is what someone’s heart rate looks and sounds like when they
are relaxed. Next they were told that they would see a video of
the heart rate of the female models (seen during vicarious
learning) when they were putting their hands in the boxes to
touch the animal. Children consecutively saw one still image
of each of the three females in the video paired with another
8 s video clip of a heart rate. For children in the inflation
groups (fear video-inflation and neutral video-inflation), the
heart rate displayed was very fast (approx. 142–150 bpm) and
the sentence, ‘Wow, look how fast their heart rate is, theymust
have been really scared’ was displayed at the bottom of the
screen. For children in the deflation groups (fear video-
deflation and neutral video-deflation), children saw the nor-
mal heart rate they had earlier seen described as relaxed
(approx. 68–72 bpm) and the sentence, ‘Their heart isn’t beat-
ing very fast, they couldn’t have been very scared’ was
displayed at the bottom of the screen.
FBQ 2 and NRT 2 The children completed the FBQ and NRT
a second time to determine whether fear beliefs and behavioral
preferences had changed as a result of vicarious learning.
Behavioral Avoidance Task Finally, children were shown two
touch-boxes and told that a quokka was in one, and a cuscus
was in the other. The quokka was on the left and the cuscus
was on the right, and children were asked to stand on a line
positioned 1 m from the boxes. They were given verbal in-
structions to approach the quokka and the stopwatch was
started as soon as the instructions had been given. Children
then had 15 s to approach the box. Heart-rate was taken at a 0 s
(baseline measure), as the child approached the box (approach
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measure), as the child put their hand into the box (hand-in
measure) and as the child withdrew their hand from the box
(hand-out measure). The time it took for the child to approach
the box was also recorded. If the child did not approach the
box after 15 s, it was assumed that they did not wish to do so
and the procedure moved on. After the first animal, children
were asked to return back to the line and the same procedure
was used for the second animal.
Debrief Debriefing involved verbal explanations about the
experiment, correct written information about the animals to
ensure no false impressions had been created by the experi-
ment, and age-appropriate worksheets to complete in order to
reinforce this.
Results
A rejection criterion of p<0.05 was used for all subsequent
analyses and effect sizes (r) are reported where interpretable
and otherwise as partial eta-squared (η2p). Cohen (1988, 1992)
suggestions about what constitutes a large or small effect are:
r=0.10 is a small effect; r=0.30 is a medium effect; and r=
0.50 is a large effect. For partial eta-squared: η2p=0.02 is a
small effect; η2p=0.13 is a medium effect; and η
2
p=0.26 is a
large effect.
Fear Beliefs
Figure 1 displays the mean change in fear belief scores for
modeled and unmodeled animals in each revaluation group
following fear and neutral vicarious learning. There was an
increase in children’s fear beliefs for the fear modeled animal
in the inflation and control group, compared to smaller chang-
es for unmodeled animals. Fear beliefs in the deflation group
decreased for fear modeled animals and slightly increased for
unmodeled animals. The graph shows that children’s fear be-
liefs for animals following neutral vicarious learning showed
small decreases in the deflation and control groups and a slight
increase in the inflation group. Changes for unmodeled ani-
mals were negligible in all three neutral revaluation groups.
A 2(modeling condition: modeled vs. unmodeled)×
2(modeling type: fear vs. neutral)×3(revaluation: inflation,
deflation, control) mixed ANOVA comparing changes in fear
beliefs (FBQ2 minus FBQ1) scores indicated no significant
main effect of modeling condition F(1, 88)=1.49, p=0.27, r=
0.13, but a significant main effect of modeling type, F(1, 88)=
12.51, p<0.001, r=0.35 and revaluation, F(2, 88)=10.27,
p<0.001, η2p=0.19, and a significant modeling condition×
Fig. 1 Mean (and SE) change in
fear belief scores for the modeled
and unmodeled animals following
fear or neutral vicarious learning
for each revaluation group
(inflation, deflation and control)
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revaluation interaction, F(2, 88)=8.27, p=0.001, η2p=0.16.
This interaction indicates changes in fear beliefs as a result
of modelling and the type of US revaluation received. It ig-
nores whether modeling was neutral or fear-related but is in-
teresting from a theoretical point of view because even initial-
ly neutral associations may later be revalued as more or less
threatening. Thus the interaction was followed up with simple
effects analyses comparing fear beliefs for modeled and
unmodeled animals following inflation, deflation or no reval-
uation. Results indicated a significant increase in fear beliefs
for the modeled animal (M=0.66, 95 % CI [0.34, 0.98]) com-
pared to the unmodeled animal (M=0.18, 95 % CI [−0.02,
0.38]) following inflation, F(1, 91)=10.17, p=0.002, r=
0.32, and a significant decrease in fear beliefs for the modeled
animal (M=−0.32, 95 % CI [−0.55, −0.09]) compared to the
unmodeled animal (M=0.02, 95 % CI [−0.19, 0.22]) follow-
ing deflation, F(1, 91)=5.09, p=0.03, r=0.23. However, there
was no significant difference between the modeled (M=0.12,
95 % CI [−0.21, 0.45]) and unmodeled animal (M=−0.05,
95 % CI [−0.24, 0.15]) in the control group (no revaluation),
F(1, 91)=1.15, p=0.29, r=0.11. Difference scores were cre-
ated by computing the change in fear beliefs for the modeled
animal minus change in fear beliefs for the unmodeled animal
for each revaluation group. Follow-up t-tests were then carried
out comparing inflation and deflation groups to the control
group. Using a Bonferroni correction for carrying out two t-
tests meant that an alpha criterion of 0.025 was used as the
significance cut-off. Results indicated significant decreases in
fear beliefs in the deflation group (M=−0.34, 95 % CI [−0.56,
−0.12]) compared to the control group (M=0.17, 95 % CI
[−0.24, 0.58]), t(29)=−2.61, p=0.01, r=0.29, but despite ev-
idence of a small effect, increases in the inflation group (M=
0.48, 95 % CI [0.20, 0.76]) compared to the control group
were non-significant, t(29)=1.38, p=0.18, r=0.21. Thus US
devaluation but not inflation significantly affected children’s
fear beliefs for animals that they had previously associated
with a fearful or neutral model.
There was also a significant modeling condition×modeling
type interaction, F(1, 88)=1.86, p=0.02, r=0.14. This effect
showed that the type of modeling (fear or neutral) given to
children significantly affected their beliefs about the modeled
and unmodeled animal. Finally, the modeling condition×
modeling type×revaluation interaction was also significant,
F(2, 88)=3.15, p=0.048, η2p=0.07, indicating that the effect
of modeling condition (modeled or unmodeled) and modeling
type (fear or neutral) on fear beliefs was different across re-
valuation groups. Further analysis was carried out to explore
these differences. Simple effects analyses comparing changes
in fear beliefs for modeled and unmodeled animals in each
group indicated a significant change in fear beliefs for
modeled animals compared to unmodeled animals in all three
fear modeling groups: fear beliefs increased for the modeled
animal (M=1.06, 95 % CI [0.59, 1.54]) compared to the
unmodeled animal (M=0.30, 95 % CI [−0.05, 0.66]) in the
inflation group, F(1, 88)=14.07, p<0.001, r=0.37, and also
increased for the modeled animal (M=0.56, 95 % CI [0.06,
1.06]) compared to the unmodeled animal (M=−0.01, 95 %
CI [−0.28, 0.26]) in the control group, F(1, 88)=7.45, p=
0.008, r=0.28. Fear beliefs for the modeled animal (M=
−0.31, 95 % CI [−0.67, 0.04]) compared to the unmodeled
animal (M=−0.12, 95 % CI [−0.21, 0.44]) decreased in the
deflation group, F(1, 88)=4.45, p=0.04, r=0.22. Following
neutral modeling, there were no significant differences in the
change in fear beliefs between the modeled (M=0.25, 95% CI
[−0.12, −0.62]) and unmodeled animal (M=0.05, 95 % CI
[−0.16, 0.27]) after inflation, F(1, 88)=0.94, p=0.34, r=
0.10, deflation, F(1, 88)=1.52, p=0.22, r=0.13 (modeled an-
imal:M=−0.33, 95 % CI [−0.66, −0.004], unmodeled animal:
M=−0.08, 95% CI [−0.35, 0.19]), or in the control group F(1,
88)=1.30, p=0.26, r=0.12 (modeled animal:M=−0.33, 95 %
CI [−0.68, 0.03], unmodeled animal: M=−0.09, 95 % CI
[−0.41, 0.23])). The results indicated then that fear beliefs
increased significantly following fear modeling and fear
modeling plus US inflation, and decreased significantly fol-
lowing fear modeling plus US deflation. Given that no signif-
icant changes were found in the neutral groups, further anal-
yses were conducted on the fear groups only. Difference
scores were created by computing the change in fear beliefs
for the modeled animal minus change in fear beliefs for the
unmodeled animal for each revaluation group. Follow-up t-
tests were then carried out comparing inflation and deflation
groups to the control group. A Bonferroni alpha criterion of
0.025 was used to correct for running two t-tests. Results
indicated a significant decrease in the deflation group (M=
−0.43, 95 % CI [−0.74, −0.12]) compared to the control group
(M=0.57, 95 % CI [−0.03, 1.18]), t(14)=−3.25, p=0.006, r=
0.66, but no significant increase in the inflation group (M=
0.76, 95 % CI [0.31, 1.21]) compared to the control group,
t(14)=0.70, p=0.49, r=0.18.
Thus US devaluation significantly affected children’s fear
beliefs irrespective of whether the original vicarious learning
was fear-related or neutral: US deflation affects learnt re-
sponses even when the original CS-US association is neutral.
Specific to fear-related vicarious learning, US deflation signif-
icantly lowered children’s fear beliefs compared to no revalu-
ation; however, there was no effect of US inflation.
Avoidance Preferences
The maximum recorded distance from figure to animals on the
nature reserve task was 680 mm; the minimum recorded dis-
tance was 0 mm, where the figure was actually touching the
animal. Figure 2 demonstrates the mean change in distance
(NRT 2 – NRT 1) children positioned themselves from the
modeled and unmodeled animal in the nature reserve task, in
each revaluation group. The graph indicates that following
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fear vicarious learning, children placed themselves further
away from the fear modeled animal in both the inflation group
and control (vicarious learning only) group, but there was
practically no change for the unmodeled animal in each case.
In the deflation group, children placed themselves slightly
closer to both the modeled and unmodeled animals following
deflation. Following neutral vicarious learning, the graph also
indicates almost no change in behavioral preferences for both
modeled and unmodeled animals in the inflation and control
groups. In the deflation group, children placed themselves
closer to the modeled animal following deflation.
A 2(modeling condition: modeled vs. unmodeled)×
2(modeling type: fear vs. neutral)×3(revaluation: inflation,
deflation, control) mixed ANOVA analysis conducted on na-
ture reserve task change (distance post-modeling minus dis-
tance pre-modeling) scores indicated a significant main effect
of modeling condition, F(1, 88)=9.79, p=0.002, r=0.32,
modeling type, F(1, 88)=5.82, p=0.02, r=0.25, and revalua-
tion, F(2, 88)=4.75, p=0.01, η2p=0.10. The modeling condi-
tion×revaluation interaction was also significant, F(2, 88)=
11.97, p<0.001, η2p=0.21. This effect shows whether chang-
es in avoidance preferences differ between revaluation groups
for modeled animals compared to unmodeled animals but ig-
nores whether modeling was neutral or fear-related. This ef-
fect is interesting because, theoretically, even neutral
associations can subsequently be revalued. As for the fear
beliefs analysis, difference scores were created by computing
changes in avoidance preferences for modeled animals minus
changes in avoidance preferences for unmodeled animals for
each revaluation group. Follow-up t-tests comparing inflation
and deflation groups to the control group indicated a signifi-
cant decrease in the deflation group (M=−39.19, 95 % CI
[−87.43, 9.06]) compared to the control group (M=90.37,
95 % CI [45.68, 135.05]), t(29)=−4.50, p<0.001, r=0.37,
but no significant difference in the inflation group (M=
53.28, 95 % CI [9.65, 96.91]) compared to the control group,
t(29)=−1.29, p=0.21, r=0.21 (using a Bonferroni corrected
alpha of 0.025 as the significance threshold for conducting
two t-tests).
The modeling condition×modeling type interaction was
significant, F(1, 88)=32.26, p<0.001, r=0.56, indicating that
the type of modeling (fear or neutral) significantly affected
avoidance preferences for the modeled compared to
unmodeled animal. Simple effects analyses showed mean in-
creases in children’s avoidance preferences for fear modeled
animals was significantly greater (M=74.68, 95 % CI [28.22,
121.14]), than for (fear) unmodeled animals, which actually
showed a small decrease (M=−21.77, 95 % CI [−57.59,
14.06]), F(1, 92)=30.19, p=< 0.001, r=0.50. Thus, indicating
that, overall, fear-related vicarious learning caused increases
Fig. 2 Mean (and SE) change in
distance on the nature reserve task
(avoidance preferences) for the
modeled and unmodeled animals
following fear or neutral vicarious
learning for each revaluation
group (inflation, deflation and
control)
J Abnorm Child Psychol (2015) 43:1355–1367 1361
in children’s avoidance preferences for animals. In contrast,
avoidance preferences decreased for neutral modeled animal
(M=−34.36, 95 % CI [−65.70, −3.02]) compared to the
(neutral) unmodeled animal (M=−5.19, 95 % CI [−24.10,
13.72]) but this change was not significant, F(1, 92)=2.76,
p=0.10, r=0.17. Finally, the modeling condition×modeling
type×revaluation interaction was not significant, F(2, 88)=
1.28, p=0.29, η2p=0.03. Therefore the effect of fear vicarious
learning compared to neutral modeling was not significantly
different across revaluation groups and there was no evidence
that the effect of US revaluation on avoidance preferences was
any different for fear modeled animals compared to neutral
modeled animals.
Behavioral Avoidance
In total, 45 children preferred not to approach and touch the
modeled animal; eight in the fear-inflation group, eight in the
neutral-inflation, 11 in the fear-deflation, six in the neutral-
deflation, seven in the fear-control group and five in the
neutral-control group. Similarly, 42 children did not want to
approach the unmodeled animal; seven in the fear-Inflation
group, eight in the neutral-inflation, 10 in the fear-deflation,
five in the neutral- deflation, six in the fear-control group and
six in the neutral-control group. All children who did not wish
to approach the animals were attributed a time of 15 s, the
maximum time allowed to approach boxes. This meant that
the data were non-normally distributed (negatively skewed),
and this can negatively affect ANOVA calculations, particu-
larly when sample sizes are not large.
Figure 3 shows mean approach times to modeled and
unmodeled animals in each revaluation group. The graph in-
dicates that children took slightly longer to approach the fear
modeled animal compared to the unmodeled animal in all
three revaluation groups. Following neutral vicarious learning
though, children’s approach times were very similar for
modeled and unmodeled animals in the inflation and deflation
groups, but took longer to approach the unmodeled animal
than the modeled animal in the control group.
A 2(modeling condition: modeled vs. unmodeled)×
2(modeling type: fear vs. neutral)×3(revaluation: inflation,
deflation, control) mixed ANOVA analysis was carried out
on approach times. Results revealed that the main effect of
modeling type was nonsignificant, F(1, 88)=3.62, p=0.06,
r=0.20, and there was no significant main effect of modeling
condition, F(1, 88)=2.93, p=0.09, r=0.18, or revaluation,
F(2, 88)=0.95, p=0.39, η2p=0.02, or modeling condition×
revaluation interaction, F(2, 88)=1.46, p=0.24, η2p=0.03.
The modeling condition×modeling type interaction was sig-
nificant, F(1, 88)=12.11, p=0.001, r=0.35, indicating that the
Fig. 3 Mean (and SE) time it
took to approach the modeled and
unmodeled animals during the
touch box task, following fear or
neutral vicarious learning for each
revaluation group (inflation,
deflation and control)
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type of modeling (fear or neutral) children saw significantly
affected approach times for modeled compared to unmodeled
animals: approach times were longer for the fear modeled
animal (M=12.06, 95 % CI [10.76, 13.36]), compared to the
(fear) unmodeled animal (M=9.55, 95 % CI [7.81, 11.30]),
and both the neutral modeled animal (M=8.36, 95% CI [6.48,
10.24]) and the (neutral) unmodeled animal (M=9.17, 95 %
CI [7.45, 10.89]). However, the modeling condition×model-
ing type×revaluation interaction was non-significant, F(2,
88)=1.79, p=0.17, η2p=0.04, indicating that behavioral
avoidance was not different across revaluation groups.
Heart Rate
Table 1 displays the mean heart rate when approaching the
modeled and unmodeled animals in each revaluation group
following fear and neutral vicarious learning. A 2(modeling
condition: modeled vs. unmodeled)×2(modeling type: fear
vs. neutral)×3(revaluation: inflation, deflation, control)×
4(time: baseline, approach, hand-in, hand-out) mixed
ANOVA carried out on heart rate measures, revealed a signif-
icant main effect of time, F(3, 105)=23.18, p<0.001, η2p=
0.40, but the main effect of modeling condition was nonsig-
nificant, F(1, 35)=3.61, p=0.07, r=0.31, and there was no
significant modeling condition×revaluation×time interaction,
F(6, 105)=1.82, p=0.10, η2p=0.09. More important though,
there was a significant modeling condition×modeling type×
time interaction, F(3, 105)=15.79, p<0.001, η2p=0.31, indi-
cating that the type of modeling (fear or neutral) significantly
affected heart rate over time for modeled compared to
unmodeled animals. The important modeling condition×
modeling type×revaluation×time interaction was also signif-
icant, F(6, 105)=2.68, p=0.02, η2p=0.13, indicating that the
this effect of vicarious learning on heart rate over time differed
depending on the US revaluation group children were in.
This interaction was followed up with separate 2(modeling
condition: modeled vs. unmodeled)×4(time: baseline, ap-
proach, hand-in, hand-out) mixed ANOVAs for each model-
ing type-revaluation group. Results for the fear modeling-
inflation group indicated no significant main effect of model-
ing condition, F(1, 4)=2.43, p=0.19, r=0.61, but a significant
main effect of time, F(3, 12)=6.85, p=0.006, η2p=0.63, and
the crucial modeling condition×time interaction, F(3, 12)=
4.11, p=0.03, η2p=0.51, indicating that following fear model-
ing and inflation, heart rate differed over time when ap-
proaching modeled compared to unmodeled animals. Howev-
er, planned comparisons comparing modeled to unmodeled
animals indicated that, despite large effect sizes, children’s
increase in heart rate from baseline to placing their hand in
the box did not quite reach significance, F(1, 4)=6.00, p=
0.07, r=0.77, and no significant difference was found between
the increase in heart rate from baseline to approaching the box,
F(1, 4)=4.24, p=0.11, r=0.72, or the increase in heart rate
from baseline to withdrawing their hand from the box, F(1,
4)=3.37, p=0.14, r=0.68 (see Table 1). Although differences
in heart rate were nonsignificant, effect sizes were large and
the number of children that approached both animals was very
small (N=5), suggesting that nonsignificance may actually
have been the result of lack of power (the low N also suggests
that these effect sizes, although large, will lack precision, mak-
ing it important to replicate the effects in larger studies).
For the fear modeling-deflation group, all results were non-
significant for: modeling condition, F(1, 4)=0.35, p=0.59, r=
0.28; time, F(3, 12)=2.67, p=0.10, η2p=0.40; and the model-
ing condition×time interaction, F(3, 12)=2.67, p=0.10, η2p=
0.40. Results for the fear modeling-control group showed no
Table 1 Mean [and 95 % CI] heart rate when approaching the modeled and unmodeled animals during the touch box task, following fear or neutral
vicarious learning for each revaluation group (inflation, deflation and control)
Baseline Approach Hand-In Hand-Out
Neutral Vicarious Learning
Modeled Animal Inflation 104.80 [99.39, 110.21] 104.50 [95.14, 113.86] 104.75 [95.46, 114.04] 104.75 [95.46. 114.04]
Deflation 102.00 [93.84, 110.16] 107.11 [94.62, 119.60] 107.11 [94.62, 119.60] 106.89 [94.40. 119.38]
Control 94.40 [85.95, 102.85] 94.80 [81.58, 108.02] 95.00 [81.75, 108.26] 95.40 [82.32, 108.48]
Unmodeled Animal Inflation 103.80 [98.55, 109.05] 104.88 [94.87, 114.88] 105.00 [95.09, 114.91] 105.25 [94.95, 115.55]
Deflation 101.20 [92.89, 109.51] 106.40 [95.28, 117.52] 106.60 [95.50, 117.70] 106.80 [95.45, 118.15]
Control 94.80 [85.79, 103.81] 97.56 [84.16, 110.95] 97.78 [84.17, 111.39] 98.00 [84.42, 111.58]
Fear Vicarious Learning
Modeled Animal Inflation 106.71 [100.27, 113.16] 107.14 [97.60, 116.69] 108.00 [97.81, 118.19] 108.00 [97.81, 118.19]
Deflation 102.29 [94.51, 110.06] 96.40 [84.44, 108.36] 97.20 [85.21, 109.19] 97.20 [85.21, 109.19]
Control 102.13 [95.86, 108.41] 101.25 [91.22, 111.28] 102.75 [92.48, 113.02] 104.50 [93.75, 115.25]
Unmodeled Animal Inflation 107.29 [100.67, 113.91] 106.50 [96.84, 116.16] 106.50 [96.84, 116.16] 106.75 [97.38, 116.12]
Deflation 102.36 [94.11, 110.60] 99.67 [88.53, 110.81] 99.67 [88.53, 110.81] 99.67 [88.53, 110.81]
Control 101.86 [94.79, 108.92] 100.22 [89.34, 111.10] 100.44 [89.69, 111.20] 100.67 [89.93, 111.40]
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significant main effect of modeling condition, F(1, 5)=2.21,
p=0.20, r=0.55, but a significant main effect of time, F(3,
15)=7.09, p=0.003, η2p=0.59, and the important modeling
condition×time interaction, F(3, 15)=5.66, p=0.008, η2p=
0.53, indicating that heart-rate differed across time points
when approaching modeled and unmodeled animals. Planned
comparisons found no significant difference from baseline to
children approaching, F(1, 4)=0.09, p=0.77, r=0.15 (see
Table 1), or placing their hand in the box, F(1, 4)=4.62, p=
0.08, r=0.73. However, children’s heart rate had significantly
increased from baseline to withdrawing their hand from the
box, F(1, 4)=8.57, p=0.03, r=0.83, suggesting devaluation
had little effect. In order to compare any differences in effects
in the three revaluation groups, a regression slope was com-
puted for each participant over the 4 time points (baseline,
approach, hand-in and hand-out) following fear vicarious
learning. A mixed ANOVA 2(modeling condition: modeled
vs. unmodeled)×3(revaluation: inflation, deflation, control)
was carried out on the computed betas following fear vicari-
ous learning, revealing a significant main effect of modeling
condition; F(1, 13)=4.67, p=0.05, r=0.51, but no significant
modeling condition×revaluation interaction; F(2, 13)=0.07,
p=0.93, η2p=0.01. Thus the findings show the effect of
modelling was not significantly different across groups.
Results for the neutral modeling-inflation group revealed a
significant main effect of time, F(3, 21)=3.39, p=0.04, η2p=
0.33, but no significant main effect of modeling condition,
F(1, 7)=0.009, p=0.93, r=0.04, or the critical modeling con-
dition×time interaction, F(3, 21)=1.63, p=0.21, η2p=0.19.
For the neutral modeling-deflation group, like the fear
modeling-deflation group, all results were non-significant:
modeling condition, F(1, 8)=1.47, p=0.16, r=0.39, time,
F(3, 24)=0.31, p=0.82 η2p=0.04, modeling condition×time
interaction, F(3, 24)=2.45, p=0.09, η2p=0.24. Results for the
neutral-control group were also all non-significant: animal,
F(1, 7)=2.03, p=0.20, r=0.47, time, F(3, 21)=1.00, p=
0.41, η2p=0.13, animal×time interaction, F(3, 21)=1.00, p=
0.41, η2p=0.13.
Correlations
Correlation analyses were carried out to explore whether chil-
dren’s baseline fear beliefs for fear modeled animals influ-
enced subsequent learning and revaluation for the animals.
For example, whether having high fear for the animals at the
beginning of the experiment would be associated with greater
responding to vicarious fear-learning. Baseline fear beliefs
were significantly negatively correlated with changes in fear
beliefs in the control group, r(15)=−0.54, p=0.04, but not
other groups. This indicates that increases in fear beliefs were
larger when fear beliefs began at a lower baseline. They were
also significantly correlated with pre-learning avoidance pref-
erences in the deflation group, r(16)=0.59, p=0.02, and
control group, r(15)=0.66, p=0.008. However, there were
no significant correlations between baseline fear beliefs and
changes in avoidance preferences. All correlations for baseline
fear beliefs with behavioral avoidance and heart rate were also
non-significant.
Discussion
The current study explored the effects of US revaluation on
fear responses following vicarious learning. Results for vicar-
ious learning replicated previous research showing fear
modeling leads to significant increases in fear beliefs, avoid-
ance preferences, avoidance behavior and heart rate (e.g.,
Askew et al. 2008, 2013; Askew and Field 2007; Dunne and
Askew 2013; Reynolds et al. 2014). One of the main aims of
the study was to see if post-vicarious learning US inflation
would increase scores on fear-related measures further. How-
ever, findings showed that inflating how scared the models
appeared to be (i.e., the US) did not result in significantly
greater increases in fear beliefs for modeled animals compared
to unmodeled animals than occurred without revaluation: sim-
ilar increases were found in a control group that had received
the vicarious learning procedure without subsequent US re-
valuation. A second aim was to test whether post-learning
deflation of the US would prevent increases otherwise found
following fear-related vicarious learning. Deflating how
scared models appeared to be not only prevented increases,
but resulted in significant decreases in fear beliefs for the
modeled animal compared to unmodeled animals; this de-
crease was significantly greater than for unrevaluated fear
modelled animals, for which fear beliefs actually increased.
In fact, decreases in fear beliefs for previously fear-modeled
animals caused by US deflation were similar to those found
for animals children had never seen with scared models. Thus
US devaluation may be a successful means to prevent the
development of fear beliefs following a traumatic vicarious
learning episode with a stimulus.
The study also demonstrated that irrespective of whether
the vicarious learning was fear-related or neutral, children
showed a decrease in fear beliefs and avoidance preferences
on the nature reserve task following US deflation compared to
the control group. This makes sense given that children re-
ceiving neutral modeling would also, like those that had re-
ceived fear modeling, form a CS-US association that may later
become devalued following US deflation. Indeed no differ-
ence in devaluation was found for animals that were fear or
neutral modeled. However, comparable results were not found
for US inflation: despite increases in avoidance preferences
following inflation for fear and neutral modeled animals, this
increase was not significantly greater than for animals in the
unrevaluated control group. Thus, like fear beliefs, avoidance
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preference results only provide support for an effect of US
deflation.
Effects of US revaluation were not found for other fear
measures. Following US inflation, children took longer to
approach fear modeled animals compared to unmodeled ani-
mals but there was no difference across revaluation groups.
Likewise, increases in children’s heart rate for fear modeled
compared to unmodeled animals was only found in the control
group. Therefore these results show evidence of the effect of
vicarious fear learning on children’s avoidance and heart rate
responses for animals, replicating Reynolds et al. (2014)) find-
ings, but do not show evidence for a significant effect of US
revaluation on these responses (though low power has con-
tributed to this conclusion).
Only US devaluation was found to influence self-reported
fear-beliefs and avoidance preferences then; no other measure
showed a convincing US revaluation effect. There are several
possible interpretations of these results. One interpretation is
that vicarious learning is not underpinned by CS-US learning,
but by S-R learning. Askew et al. (2008) also failed to find that
revaluing the USwith verbal information after vicarious learn-
ing affected fear beliefs for the CS. They pointed out that the
US revaluation procedure they used (verbal information in the
form of sound clips) may not have been potent enough to
interact with the vicarious learning. The current research ar-
guably used a more potent revaluation method by not only
providing both a visual, auditory and written procedure, but
also by providing the revaluation information through heart
rate responses as opposed to simply telling the children the
models were more, or less, scared than indicated. Research by
Kravetz (1974) suggests that auditory changes in heart rate are
sufficient to vicariously condition listeners’ heart rate. More-
over, the current study did not only explore the effects of US
revaluation on fear beliefs, but also on additional behavioral
and physiological responses. However, the fact that US deval-
uation effects were found for fear beliefs and avoidance pref-
erences strongly suggests that CS-US associations underpin
vicarious learning. Devaluation of the US alone, without the
CS being presented again, were enough to reduce fear beliefs
(CR) for the CS, suggesting that an association formed be-
tween the CS and US activated the CR. It is difficult to see
how the findings could be explained by direct association
between the CS and CR.
A more plausible explanation for the mixed findings might
be that vicarious fear learning is only susceptible to US reval-
uation in certain response systems. Of Lang’s (1968) three
independent fear response systems, revaluation may only in-
fluence the verbal-cognitive system (subjective report), but
not the physiological or behavioral avoidance systems. The
current experiment does not directly test this; however, the
fact that themost convincing effects were found for fear beliefs
(subjective report response system) does support this interpre-
tation. In addition, it could be that the different effects
across the different responses reflect differing sensitivities in
the measures used. However, based on previous research
(Reynolds et al. 2014), there is no evidence that the fear beliefs
questionnaire or nature reserve task are more sensitive mea-
sures than the others used here and therefore more likely to
detect US revaluation effects. Finally, it is also important to
consider the possibility that the effects of US devaluation on
self-reported fear beliefs and avoidance preferences are simply
the result of demand characteristics. That is, children may have
deliberately modified their responses to reflect what they be-
lieved researchers wanted them to do. Clearly, this is more
likely to occur in a self-report measure than a measure of heart
rate responses, which are arguably very difficult to consciously
control. However, this does not convincingly explain the lack
of US inflation effects, which we might also expect to show
parallel changes because of demand features. That all learning
effects were the result of demand characteristics is also ex-
tremely unlikely given that general vicarious learning effects
were also found for heart rate, which is arguably very difficult
to consciously modify.
The current findings are important because they indicate
that fear-related beliefs and avoidance preferences following
vicarious learning may be modified by experiences after the
original learning event. In particular, US deflation decreased
children’s fear-beliefs for animals immediately following a
vicarious fear learning episode. In contrast, the fear beliefs
of children who did not have US devaluation increased, indi-
cating that early US devaluation is likely to be an effective
means of reducing or preventing the development of vicari-
ously acquired fear cognitions (Davey 1989). For example, if
a parent or teacher recognizes that a child has witnessed a peer
responding fearfully (US) to a stimulus (CS) they could seek
to devalue that peer’s response and prevent fear developing.
Similarly the findings suggest that if a parent or teacher has
themselves shown fear of something in front of a child,
devaluing their fear response is likely to be beneficial to the
child. One of the strengths of the current paradigm is that it
enables investigation of revaluation directly after the learning
experience. The findings are therefore specific to early inter-
vention and the prevention of fear. From a clinical perspective,
it would also be important to explore whether deflating the US
at a later time point would reduce established fear (i.e., fear
treatment rather than prevention).
More generally, the fact that CS-US associations underpin
vicarious learning suggests ways that prevention and treat-
ment interventions might be developed to specifically target
these associations. Much is already known about the proper-
ties of CS-US associations; for example, the contingency be-
tween a CS and US is known to be critical for associative
learning (see e.g., Field 2006a). Prior positive learning history
with a stimulus is likely to prevent future vicarious fear learn-
ing by weakening the contingency between the stimulus and
any fear-related outcome (US). Thus educational or
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experiential interventions that develop a positive learning his-
tory for a stimulus are likely to prevent later fear development.
Similarly, when vicarious learning has already occurred, treat-
ment could be focused on weakening learnt CS-US associa-
tions. US devaluation and commonly used techniques such as
extinction and counterconditioning are likely to be effica-
cious, but factors such as learning context and CS salience
may also play an important role.
From a clinical perspective, understanding learning mech-
anisms is potentially critical for designing more effective in-
terventions for reducing children’s fear (Field 2006a). In prac-
tice though, the acquisition of individual fears and phobias are
likely to be determined by a complex set of factors and not
merely be the result of one causal influence such as vicarious
learning. Fear development might involve both direct and in-
direct learning along with other factors including genetic, bi-
ological, and parenting influences (e.g., Muris and
Merckelbach 2001). Therefore, any interpretation of the re-
sults needs to be considered in the context of this wider set
of influences. Additionally, given that a non-clinical sample of
children was investigated, only cautious generalizations to
clinically anxious populations can be made. On the other
hand, one of the strengths of the vicarious learning paradigm
is that it represents a non-harmful analogue of real world
learning that can be used with non-fearful children.
To summarize, the findings indicate that US devaluation
can reduce fear cognitions for animals following fear-related
vicarious learning, implying that CS-US associations under-
pin vicarious learning in children. Thus the research adds cru-
cial information to our current understanding of the underly-
ing mechanisms of vicarious learning and has important im-
plications for interventions to prevent fear development.
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